An active week has passed. From surviving the chaotic LAX Terminal 6 with kids, to handling M&A transactions within the portfolio, to ending my Twitter account @the_red_deer, it’s good to be home. Moreover, it’s even more exciting with summer arriving in Seattle, and the installation of central A/C. I’m ready for warm weather.
In a previous post, I mentioned four investments that we own classified as code red, indicating my concern about their ability to maintain current distributions. Two of them resolved within the quarter, one by reporting updated financials, which reduced the key uncertainties, and sent the stock 30% higher. The other resolved by announcing the sale of the asset – a retail shopping center. However, a third red-listed investment resolved this week, but not positively.
Franchise Group revealed that it signed a definitive agreement to be acquired by its management team at a disappointing price. As expected, the company adjusted its earnings to support the idea that the discounted takeout offer is reasonable. Although treating stock investments as owning the whole business isn’t entirely false, it’s not entirely true either. As a minority holder, risks exist that don’t exist when you own the entire company.
In this case, when management sees itself as a keen capital allocator, that applies to their situation, not always to that of the shareholder. The CEO is most certainly maximizing value for himself by taking the company private, which is legal. One may not think it’s fair, but it’s a lesson that financial markets are a dog-eat-dog world, and if you expect someone to take care of you, you won’t make it far.
So what’s the lesson here? One is diversification. An index investor won’t ever have to write this post in the extreme. In our case, taking a 30% loss on a 3% position doesn’t really move the needle. Second, one has to beware of backing “capital allocator” management teams. They say the things shareholders want to hear but aren’t necessarily on your team. And three, there are ways to own things that reduce such risk. Size, regulated businesses, and shareholder structure may limit this specific take-under risk, but they may open other risks.
Replacing an 8% yielding security with equity level duration isn’t an easy task. But sometimes life takes away and gives back. Good portfolio management involves pulling the thread of one’s interests without an explicit goal. For me, this led to finding companies that I would like to own, but whose valuations seem a bit high. On the same day as Franchise Group’s announcement, a company I track reported earnings and fell north of 20%. Ironically, the distribution was equal (on a dollars-per-share basis) to Franchise.
Lastly, I announced the closure of my Twitter handle @the_red_deer, which had over 5,500 followers. With the growth of my account came an influx of garbage in direct messages and responses. Twitter has been my mentor in a world without a real one, but the interaction from entry-level retail investors created substantial noise and distraction. Furthermore, I found that 90% of the value really came from interaction with perhaps 25 people and following fewer than 200 people. Being human means being influenced by likes/retweets/responses, and even though I didn’t care about engagement, I knew that my subconscious did. I can confidently say that I don’t feel the subconscious influence anymore after shutting down my account. Nonetheless, shutting down @the_red_deer doesn’t mean I won’t be on Twitter. In fact, I’ve already rebooted and am sure that I’ll re-engage with those that I’ve found mutually beneficial.
Onward to the next chapter of learning.