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Zooming Out

Yesterday I finally finished the 1.5 hour interview with Lyall Taylor that I had on my to-do list. Lyall is a super controversial figure within the financial Twitter world. One can almost always count on him coming in with an opposing take to news, views, and investments. I find him interesting because few do what he does: solo manages a truly global fund with 150+ positions that is turning over regularly (at least in the smaller position / long tail) in deep value names. That is brutally hard work – and he self describes himself as someone who works constantly, to his own satisfaction.

In the interview, I found it refreshing and a good reminder of what the opportunities in the world are outside of developed Western markets. To that end, he described how 20-30% of his portfolio is in Russian or neighboring countries, a material amount in Hong Kong after the market there has cratered, another chunk in LatAm, a smidge in Africa (with caution that it is extremely inaccessible), and some in North America.

What was interesting is how he describes the quality of the businesses he owns, particularly in the financial services sector, and the price one can pay for them in those geographies. It makes a North American investor sweat hearing those metrics and prices. That said all emerging market businesses trade at those levels for a reason. But there are markets in which the capital balance is simply the inverse of North America. Specifically, there is a lack of capital that drives relative undervaluation versus an oversupply of capital driving relative overvaluation.

Russia is borderline un-investable. Africa has burned so many Western investors that only the intrepid wade in. LatAm is almost on its own cycle of recessions and recoveries. However keeping the rest of the world within the lens of what exists and is possible is always worth keeping tabs on.

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TDM Growth on the Tech Crash

I wasn’t familiar with TDM Growth Partners out of Australia until someone posted their recent missive to LPs on the seemingly confusing tech crash or lack thereof.

First, they clearly outline where the crash is and where it isn’t:

Furthermore they looked at EV / Sales metrics for the BVP Index and dropped a few major outliers representing nosebleed valuations that have persisted and the result is EV / Sales is basically within spitting distance of the long term average:

They go out to outline reasons why, with an appreciable acknowledgement of their basic of call of maybe this time is different, what is demanded of these businesses by the stock market today in terms of growth isn’t aggressive, and that it potentially indicates downright cheapness. Furthermore they go on to make accommodations for higher rates, lower exit multiples, etc. and continue to think that today’s prices are attractive.

The only thing they don’t fully acknowledge, in my opinion, is the potential for capital scarcity in the economy. Said more plainly, if the economy slows and the Fed has withdrawn its dramatic firehose of liquidity. The early 70s are symbolic of a time in which dramatic undervaluation in the market was persistent but no capital wanted to enter the market. But that is a scenario that may affect all types of businesses, not just technology. A pessimist may argue that tech stocks have further to drop in a downside scenario. An optimist, however, may rightfully say that ignores the dramatic upside that may exist.

To that end, tech stocks don’t typically pay material dividends to their shareholders, and in many cases for good reason. However it doesn’t fit my process and to that end, while fun to keep tabs on the economy broadly speaking, these stocks ultimately aren’t a fit for me.

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“Inflation Nation”

News is abuzz with the latest inflation figures clocking in at 7.5%. The US 10-year government bond yield crossed into 2% territory in response to the data. The barrage of news questioning whether the root causes are transitory or secular.

What is especially interesting about interest rates and inflation moving around is lots of assets in the market had reset to pricing reflective of very low yields. In practice it means that people would pay more for cash flows that may materialize far into the future than they would if interest rates are high, and returns today matter more than they did in the past. The net result is a lot more volatility as the market tries to guess what the Federal Reserves actions will be over the course of this and next year to combat inflation.

What is one to do to navigate this environment? The most simple blanket action one can consider is not own assets with very long dated cash flows that make up the vast majority of the cash flows. In plain English, own assets with reasonable cash yields on today’s earnings. Say a 7.5% earnings yield or more. Second, own things that may benefit from a higher rate environment. It’s no surprise that financials and energy have posted positive returns this year while technology has posted losses. Third is to fight the urge to “do something drastic” in light of a lack of simple decisions / investments to make. Keep a shortlist of companies / investments that straightforward purchase decisions, keep a reasonable amount of dry powder available, and continue cautiously investing excess cash flows regularly.

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Learning in Public

Yesterday I read about GQG Partners, a mutual fund company that has grown from ~$0 in assets in 2016 to ~$100B today. An equity investment in the GQG Partners management entity returned ~65x in that time frame (not the funds GQG manages, to be clear).

While reading about it, I posted an abbreviated version of the above on Twitter. Within 15 minutes two people wrote to me about why not to invest in the management entity (it recently went public). While I agree with them, it was very helpful to receive fully crystallized thoughts while I was chewing on how to articulate it.

As mentioned on my post on asset manager business models via Michael Vranos, public securities asset manager businesses can implode when things go bad. Investors can redeem all of their money in very short order and a business can go from managing billions to almost nothing quickly. In contrast, private fund asset managers have management fees locked in for the majority of the fund life (so secure they are being securitized) and can often contractually force additional capital calls if it needs. Extremely different business models for investors effectively performing a similar function.

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The Folly of Proprietary Deal Flow

Ask any deal maker how they get “good deals” and more often than not, “proprietary deal flow” is one of their referenced sources to get them. What is proprietary deal flow? Most would probably say they have relationships in which they are considered the preferred buyer. A select few will outline more tangible sources of “good deals,” perhaps the scale of their capital base, specialization, geographic focus, etc. I for one, find the term “proprietary deal flow” overused and unhelpful.

In contrast Josh Wolfe, co-founder of deep-technology VC firm Lux Capital, describes his deal flow process differently, and more intellectually honestly. He says that he has no idea where (specifically the source and the topical area) his next great investment may come from but he is certain that his maniacal focus on consuming diverse content, incessant networking, and deep paranoia of not knowing / understanding concepts will lead to his next deal. I suspect most investors actually follow an idea sourcing method more similar to Josh than “proprietary deal flow” being their source of best ideas.

In this vein, yesterday I posted about management fee securitization. I came across it when trying to learn more about the burgeoning GP stakes business. I found it interesting and wanted to learn more about it. In the article I linked to in yesterday’s post, there was mention of a public company investing in GP stakes off its balance sheet called Pacific Current Group. Turns out this company, traded in Australia, has a growing GP stakes business, is trading well below net asset value of its GP stakes, and pays a ~4.5% dividend.

I didn’t strike gold but the point is that I would have never found this if I didn’t just pull the thread of things that interest me. It’s not proprietary deal flow, it’s right there out in the open, but virtually impossible to systematically screen for. To that end, I presume great investors constantly pull the threads that interest them as well as position themselves as fast-moving and differentiated counter-parties. The rest just rely on…proprietary deal flow.

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Coping with the Future (and our inability to know it)

Yesterday (or perhaps late in the prior day), the ECB joined the Federal Reserve in signaling a change in policy towards fiscal tightening, specifically going backwards on its prior multi-year regime of supplying low rates and plenty of liquidity to support the global economy through the pandemic (the UK central bank also raised rates yesterday).

The million dollar question in the near term is – will a rising rate environment paired with monetary tightening (suspension of open market government bond purchasing) hurt the economy but tame inflation, help the economy and tame inflation, or hurt the economy and not tame inflation. Every tends to think about the outcome with respect to what their “book” is.

One investor group, VCs and Growth investors, talk of a central bank induced recession on the horizon. Why? In part, because the companies they own are valued (or were valued one quarter ago) at rich valuations. When rates go up, valuations decline, but rich valuations decline far more than cheap valuations broadly speaking. Simplistically, if rates go up 1% and a company traded at a 1% earnings yield (100x earnings), the valuation of the company would drop by 50% if it traded at a 2% earnings yield. If rates go up by 1% and a company trades at a 20% earnings yield (5x earnings), the valuation of the company would drop by 5% if it traded at a 21% earnings yield.

Of course, there are examples across the spectrum ending with constituents that cheer rate increases and do not believe it’s possible to have a recession given how strong the consumer, unemployment, and other core data are looking.

To that end, the reality is the vast majority of constituents across the opinion spectrum don’t truly know what will happen, chiefly because the world is a complex adaptive system that constantly evolves / morphs as inputs change. It’s not a machine that has predictable outputs with the same inputs.

The best medicine for this is understand how one’s current situation is positioned for all outcomes and avoid the worst potential spots, which in this case I believe are assets that are (1) speculative beneficiaries of high liquidity or (2) highly valued or (3) very sensitive to consumer demand.

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Public Markets – Feature or Flaw?

A few short data points before discussion.

Yesterday, one of the largest companies in the world by market value dumped ~$200B+:

Furthermore, Snap, had an unbelievable whipsaw in the same day due to blowback from FB and a positive earnings release post-close:

While movements like this tend to prompt the crowd to skewer the efficient market hypothesis in the short run, it does resurface a number of questions for the individual investor:

  • Is the occasional wild swings in publicly marked enterprise value a feature or a bug?
  • Does a public markets investor have adequate information to make high-ish probability wagers on the enterprise value of the company?
  • Are most public markets participants suited to participate in the venue?

Of course, I have thoughts on each, and there are no right answers. But they pertain to the marriage of my personality to the characteristics of public markets (both features and flaws). Your personality may merit a different set of answers.

That said, on a daily basis via Twitter, I see countless investors’ thoughts and actions provide strong implied answers to the above questions. Especially on days when the above swings in market values are extreme. Most often – investors:

  • Take price momentum as a directional indication of the quality of corporate strategy
  • Believe that their insight based on analysis of publicly available data is equal or better to the broader marketplace
  • Lack conviction when fundamentals and public marks aren’t going “up and to the right.”

Mind you, these investors I am referring to often include fiduciaries, fund managers, analysts, etc. The natural question of the reader is, does this author believe he is above the crowd and master of the universe?

No. As I laid out in a prior musing, I don’t invest (for the most part) in “businesses” explicitly. I invest in broad mandates with an investor at the helm. I’m an LP. Why? Specifically I believe that I fail the second bullet point / question I posed. But that’s okay. I carved out my niche and love the vantage point by which I can spectate and participate. The question, reader, is have you taken the introspective time to figure out what your niche truly is?

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Keeping It Simple

One of the tenets floating around my brain that gets amplified further as each year passes is: Don’t play against the best in the investing game, figure out how to ride behind them.

Few hear about the cyclists supporting the main star, the lineman supporting the quarterback, etc. In some sense, LPs support start GPs by providing the raw material to their process: capital.

I’ve been somewhat privy to the investment process of marquee investment funds as a “strategy consultant” performing commercial due diligence. Patrick OS had a saying for some of his early guests on his podcast “Invest Like the Best.” It was “This is What You’re Up Against.” That paired with my prior window into underwriting has always stuck with me.

Investments I’ve made into companies with narrow mandates (e.g., sell or focus on one narrow product area, say something like Peloton, which I haven’t owned but describes what I stay away from broadly speaking) have tended to not go well. Core reason being I lack conviction to hold them. The reason for lacking conviction is not truly understanding what I own, and depending on management’s words to define the variant view.

Investments that have gone very well tend to be “things” with broad mandates. Publicly traded private equity funds, diversified debt funds, public investment holding companies. Essentially when I remove myself from the underwriting seat of investing in narrow mandate investments and just focus on paying a reasonable price for an investor with a broad mandate, things tend to go alright.

To that end, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners (BIP) has been a longtime holding of mine. It’s a publicly traded private equity fund focused on infrastructure – and has a great management team that a strong track record in their process of acquisitions and divestitures. At times it gets expensive and rarely it gets cheap-ish. That said the long-term holder has done well:

I look forward to continue holding units in this entity for a long period of time.

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Chris Douvos on Focus

Chris Douvos was interviewed on Capital Allocators last week. For the most part – I found the interview to be fairly standard stuff. However I did enjoy hearing about the change in Silicon Valley from ~20 years ago to today, specifically with respect to focus.

Chris mentioned that in the past, one could essentially boil the ocean as a VC and meet with everyone around, whether other VCs or potential investments. Today, with so much more deal flow and market participants, one can’t boil the ocean and take all meetings.

Chris mitigates it with having thematic focus and certain constraints on potential investments. That allows him to just say no to certain meetings and not feel FOMO when they turn out to be marquee opportunities.

I relate to this – as the stock market serves up way too many opportunities than any investor has time for. Moreover, it serves up way too many opportunities that may seem enticing but are too complicated for me. Thus having a focus on yield securities (whether high or low yield, public or private) helps narrow the field dramatically. I also try to avoid business models that are single product / business focused – and look for diversified entities. Without this simple focus I’d be wholly overwhelmed and playing a game that others can do 1000x better than me.

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Crypto Washout

Cryptocurrency Prices, Charts And Market Capitalizations  CoinMarketCap.jpeg

I snapped this screenshot yesterday (Saturday, Jan 22, 2022). It appeared at that time that most of the popular crypto tokens had gone “no bid.”

One person put their less optimistic view on display:

Another put forth his bullish view on the drawdown:

While it’s fun to watch both the action and the reactions, crypto is largely out of my wheelhouse both from a knowledge and functional perspective, at least today…